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Abstract
The research presented here focuses on applying the RF “Distinct Native Attribute”
(RF-DNA) fingerprinting process to Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) hardware
devices as a means of device discrimination to mitigate risk of an attack on Supervisory
Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. A previously developed signal collection
method was implemented to collect Unintentional Radiated Emission (URE) from ten Allen
Bradley SLC-500 PLCs using a National Instruments collection platform for comparison of
results against collections taken using a Lecroy collection platform. RF-DNA fingerprints
were generated using Time-Domain (TD) features and used for device classification (a one-
to-many looks “most like” comparison) and verification (a one-to-one looks “how much
like” comparison).
Results are presented for two classification processes, the Generalized Relevance
Learning from Vectors Quantized Improved (GRLVQI) and Multiple Discriminant
Analysis Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML) processes. GRLVQI feature relevance
rankings are used here for Quantitative feature Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA),
i.e. removing all but the most influential features while still achieving the desired
classification and verification performance. Qualitative feature DRA is also used by
constructing feature sets solely comprised of one TD signal response attribute, i.e.
amplitude, phase, frequency.
Using the Lecroy collection platform the full dimensional feature set demonstrated aver-
age classification accuracy of CAVE ≥90% for the 1) MDA/ML classifier at S NR ≥6.5 dB 2)
GRLVQI classifier at S NR ≥11 dB. The National Instruments collection platform demon-
strated average classification accuracy of CAVE ≥90% for the 1) MDA/ML classifier at
S NR ≥16.5 dB 2) GRLVQI classifier at S NR ≥17 dB. This corresponds to a Lecroy gain
iv
of GS NR=10 dB in the MDA/ML classifier and a gain of GS NR=6 dB in the GRLVQI clas-
sifier.
For the Lecroy platform data at SNR=10 dB, using the MDA/ML classifier satisfied the
EER ≥10% benchmark for 100% of PLC devices for both Authorized Device Identification
and Rogue Device Rejection. The Lecroy platform data, at SNR=10 dB, using the GRLVQI
classifier, 3 of 5 devices satisfied the EER ≥10% benchmark for Authorized Device
Identification and 100% of devices for Rogue Device Rejection satisfied the EER ≥10%
benchmark. The National Instruments data, at SNR=20 dB, using the MDA/ML classifier,
3 of 5 devices satisfied the EER ≥10% benchmark for Authorized Device Identification
and 100% of devices for Rogue Device Rejection satisfied the EER ≥10% benchmark. The
National Instruments data, at SNR=20 dB, using theGRLVQI classifier, 2 of 5 devices for
Authorized Device Identification and 100% of devices for Rogue Device Rejection satisfied
the EER ≥10% benchmark. The similar results between collection platforms represent a
GS NR ≈10 dB gain using the Lecroy receiver over the National Instruments receiver.
v
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PLC HARDWARE DISCRIMINATION USING RF-DNA FINGERPRINTING
I. Introduction
This chapter introduces the research topic and describes the approach taken to attain the
research goals. Section 1.1 gives an overview of Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems and some of the issues and vulnerabilities pertaining to them. Section
1.2 describes the approach taken to implement the AFIT Radio Frequency - Distinct
Native Attribute (RF-DNA) process relative to semi-conductor devices and unintentional
emissions. Section 1.3 provides a reference for current and related research efforts.
1.1 Research Motivation
Today electronic systems are present in everyday life. It would be nearly impossible to
go outside in any urban environment or any modern day office environment and not witness
an electronic system of some kind. With the proliferation of Information Technology
(IT) systems, large networks such as the internet, cellular phone networks, and modern
television are seemingly commonplace. Less publicly discussed are the IT networks used
to operate national critical infrastructure such as the networks used in nuclear power
generation plants, waste water treatment, traffic grids, and sewage systems. These networks
are also commonplace and have been identified as a cybersecurity vulnerability [53].
A type of system often used to control operations of national critical infrastructure is
a SCADA system. SCADA systems are essentially miniature computer systems used to
control industrial processes. A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is the most basic
unit of a SCADA system and is used for controlling a particular automated process such as
temperature or pressure monitoring. .
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One of the main types of physical components in PLCs, as with virtually all electronic
devices, are Integrated Circuits (IC)s. IC devices such as, Field Programmable Gate
Array (FPGA)s, operational amplifiers, and microcontrollers are widely used and often
manufactured overseas as a method of cost reduction. The majority of ICs used in modern
military systems are made off-shore [10]. ICs can be counterfeited, or embedded with
hardware trojans [1, 10].
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) can fall prey to such IC hardware vulnerabilities.
A counterfeited device or a device that has been unknowingly altered, that is used in
control systems for critical applications poses a significant vulnerability. Furthermore,
there is in increasing reliance upon ICS networks and particularly SCADA systems
to control and monitor critical process [40]. Although critical infrastructure may be
owned by private companies or corporations, government also has a reliance on national
critical infrastructure. This co-dependence led to the formation of National Infrastructure
Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC), a program within the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) whose mission is to research and analyze, through modelling and
simulation, vulnerabilities and complexities of critical infrastructure [5, 41].
Security measures such as bit level credentials used for digital device authentication
including Media Access Control (MAC) addresses and International Mobile Equipment
Identity (IMEI) numbers exist as measures of security. When considering the Open
Systems Interconnection (OSI) model, these measure of security are at the implemented
at Application (Layer 1) or Network (Layer 5) layers. These are far from infallible and
there exist methods of bypassing these layers of security [33, 51]. PLC Operating Systems
often use proprietary communication protocols and are connected in vast networks. PLCs
themselves have limited processing power and memory availability. Because of the nature
of their implementation and operating characteristics, they are often limited in regards to
defensive monitoring software such as anti-intrusion and anti-virus software.
2
Figure 1.1: OSI 7 Layers network model [48]
Furthermore it is not uncommon for a SCADA system by remain in service for decades.
For this reason they become obsolete to modern security standards and capabilities. PLC
devices remain vulnerable to hardware trojans, substitutes and counterfeits.
Although work has been done at securing PLC devices at the higher layers of the OSI
model, comparatively little work has been done at the lowest layer i.e. the physical
waveform layer. This research augments hardware device security, in particular PLC IC
devices, by means of verifying authenticity at the physical layer. While PLCs are used as a
proof of concept for hardware devices discrimination, the topics contained herein apply to
the majority of semi-conductor based devices.
1.2 Research Approach
The goal of this research is to use Unintentional Radiated Emission (URE) produced by
IC devices as a means to discriminate between PLC devices. Inside a physical PLC device
3
there are many points where URE may be collected. Collected emissions are taken from
the microcontroller within the PLC. Previous research efforts have shown this region to be
viable for collecting device URE [43]. The collected emissions are used to develop Radio
Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprints. The fingerprints are used to
distinguish devices by exploiting Radio Frequency (RF) emission characters unique to a
device that are caused by its component manufacturing variations.
Another goal is to reliably reduce the dimensionality of RF-DNA fingerprint data sets.
Dimensional reduction allows for faster execution time and may mitigate adverse affects
on classification performance caused by noisy, irrelevant or redundant information [3, 24].
It is expected that dimensional reduction will reduce execution time with the potential to
improve classification performance.
1.2.1 Emission Collection
Using RF signal characteristics as means of device authentication as been widely
researched [2, 4, 7, 9, 12, 13, 15–17, 19, 21, 36, 38, 43, 46, 49]. Although research has
been done using both Intentional Radiated Emission (IRE) and URE, URE has not been as
well researched. The URE signals used for device discrimination differ from IRE signals
in that they are not intentionally broadcast and therefore have much lower average signal
power and do not adhere to a specified broadcast pattern. IRE and URE have collection
specific configurations accounting for required bandwidth and center frequency which is
largely determined by the Device Under Test (DUT).
1.2.2 Fingerprint Generation
Collected signals first undergo post-collection digital processing and are then used to
develop fingerprints using Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)’s RF-DNA process
[4, 9, 36, 43]. The fingerprints are constructed from statistical attributes of the Time-
Domain (TD) signal responses: amplitude, phase and frequency. The statistics used
are: standard deviation (σ), variance (σ2), skewness (γ), and kurtosis (κ). Other signal
4
features have been used in previous AFIT research such as Frequency Domain and Gabor
Transform, however this research only considers TD signal responses of URE signal
collections.
1.2.3 Device Classification
In classification a process referred to as a classifier uses RF-DNA fingerprints from
known devices to train or develop a classification model. This model represents the known
devices (Authorized Devices) fingerprint characteristics. Using the model, unknown device
fingerprints are classified or aligned (correctly or incorrectly) to a particular known device
represented in the model.
Device classification allows a one-to-many device comparison. Devices that are not
represented in the model (Rogue Devices) will still be classified as one of the Authorized
Devices i.e. all devices will be classified as one of the known Authorized devices.
Therefore a verification method is used to evaluate ”how much like” a device resembles
a selected class.
1.2.4 Device ID Verification
Verification is a one-to-one comparison of fingerprints for an unknown device to
fingerprints of a known Authorized device. The verification process is implemented for
two scenarios: Authorized Device Identification and Rogue Device Rejection.
Authorized Device Identification examines how much like an Authorized Device looks
like a different Authorized Device. Rogue Device Rejection is a comparison of how much
like a rogue device resembles an Authorized Device. The intent is for the model to be able
to clearly distinguish the Authorized Devices from each other, and correctly discriminate
between Rogue and Authorized devices. Previous researchers have been able to use the
general verification process using RF-DNA fingerprints to verify PLC microcontroller
devices with better than 99.5% accuracy [7].
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1.2.5 Cross Platform Validation
To validate the repeatability of the signal collection and fingerprinting process, two
different collection platforms are used for signal collection. The two collection platforms
are detailed in Table 3.1. The same collection method was used for both receiver platforms,
as well the devices collected against, and all supporting equipment. The results from the
two collection platforms are shown in Chapter 4. They are first presented independently,
and are then compared directly.
1.3 Research Contributions
The research goal includes expanding upon previous AFIT fingerprinting results,
and also implementing and verifying the signal collection method in [43] by replicating
the process with another receiver. Previous AFIT results were expanded by examining
the effects of feature dimensional reduction for both classification and verification, as
well as the addition of another classifer, the Multiple Discriminant Analysis Maximum
Likelihood (MDA/ML) classifier. Summarized below are the research contributions and
findings related to PLC device hardware discrimination.
1.4 Document Organization
The remainder of the document is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses
SCADA system vulnerabilities, Ladder Logic, Correlation based processing, and the
classification/verification process using the MDA/ML and GRLVQI classifiers. Chapter
3 details the implemented signal collection process, post-collection processing, and
fingerprint generation as well as feature dimensional reduction. Chapter 4 shows the
results of PLC hardware discrimination using RF-DNA fingerprinting. Chapter 5 provides
a summary of the findings as well as potential future work.
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Table 1.1: Relational mapping between technical areas of “Previous Work” and AFIT
research, and “Current Research” contributions.
Technical Area Previous Work Current Research
Addressed Ref # Addressed #
TD Features ×
[31, 32, 36, 37]
×
[46, 47, 49, 50]
SD Features × [7, 9, 39, 49]
CD Features × [46, 47]
Emission Type
Intentional (IRE) ×
[31, 32, 36, 37]
[46, 47, 49, 50]
[17, 25, 27, 28]
Unintentional (URE) × [6, 7, 9, 43, 44] ×
Burst ×
[31, 32, 36, 37]
[46, 47, 49, 50]
[17, 25, 27, 28]
Continuous × [6, 7, 9, 43, 44] ×
High SNR ×
[31, 32, 36, 37]
[46, 47, 49, 50]
[17, 25, 27, 28]
Low SNR × [6, 7, 9, 43, 44] ×
Classification/Verification Processes
MDA/ML ×
[31, 32, 36, 37]
[46, 47, 49, 50]
[17, 25, 27, 28] ×
GRLVQI × [31, 32, 36, 37] ×
LFS × [25–28]
Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA)
MDA/ML × [31, 32, 36, 37] ×
GRLVQI × [30, 36, 37] ×
LFS × [25–28]
Verification
Electronic Components × [6, 7, 9, 43, 44] ×
Authorized Wireless Devices × [17, 36, 37]
Rogue Wireless Devices × [17, 36, 37]
Device Operations × [43–45]
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II. Related Work/Literature Review
This chapter gives background information on Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)s
and device fingerprinting and discusses supporting research and associated academic
works. Section 2.1 details the significance of PLCs in the context of Supervisory Control
And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems as well as PLC and SCADA vulnerabilities.
Section 2.2 gives a description of the approach and challenges of signal collection for
PLCs and details the utilization of multiple collection platforms. Section 2.3 describes
PLC device classification and verification.
2.1 SCADA Systems
SCADA systems are used to automate and control large scale industrial applications such
as: power generation plants, traffic grids, and waste water removal systems. They consist
of a multitude of devices including PLCs and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs). Originally
SCADA systems used dedicated wires for communication between devices. Although
wired communications are still used today, wireless SCADA systems have become widely
used, particularly in remote sensing and control environments.
The earliest SCADA systems used in the 1960s were first used in power generation
plants to monitor and control sub-stations. Over the last 50 years SCADA systems
have significantly evolved as computer processing power and component size continue
to progress. However SCADA systems can have a lifetime on the order of decades and
many legacy systems often do not have the processing capabilities and to run modern day
anti-intrusion detection systems [14].
2.1.1 Programmable Logic Controllers
A particular component of a SCADA system that is used to collect sensor data and
control electro-mechanical operations is a PLC, the device to which this research is focused.
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PLCs are used to perform low-level operations within a SCADA system, such as sensory
data input and output, and were originally designed to replace physical relays. Individual
PLC devices are often referred to as modules. Modules can be specialized for certain
applications e.g. power, I/O, as well as specific types of sensor modules. Some large
SCADA systems (e.g. a power grid) can be comprised of hundreds if not thousands of
PLCs and supporting units [22].
2.1.2 Ladder Logic Programs
PLCs perform required process using a program called a Ladder Logic Program
(LLP). The name Ladder Logic originally refereed to relay logic schematics used in control
and manufacturing [35]. In the advent of the digital age Ladder Logic now commonly refers
to the widely used programming language used for programming PLCs. LLPs are executed
by a PLC in what is called a Ladder Logic scan. At the beginning of a scan the PLC first
reads all input values. It then performs the operations on the top-most “rung”, sequentially
executing all rungs. It then assigns all output values. An example LLP is depicted in Fig.
2.1.
In real world applications LLPs can be recursive and complex, containing loops and
jumps. Consider a traffic light program continually looping through traffic light patterns,
or the complexity of a power generation plant. However the LLPs used in this research
are intentionally non-recursive, i.e. there are no internal loops. The programs themselves
are very basic consisting of NOP ≤ 10 operations. This is done purposefully to ensure an
experimentally repeatable signal collection process across multiple PLC devices.
2.1.3 Vulnerabilities
As previously mentioned, PLCs can have an operational lifetime of several decades. Due
to their age many PLCs do not have the computer processing capability required to run
modern intrusion prevention and security software. This leaves many PLCs vulnerable to
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Figure 2.1: LLP example program showing a single MOV and SQR operation [43] preceded
by two logic rungs.
cyber attack. A well known example of such an attack is Stuxnet, which exploited security
vulnerabilities and injected malicious code into SCADA systems [53].
Extensive research has been done attempting to secure SCADA systems. Existing
security measures use bit level-credentials such at the Media Access Control (MAC)
address and the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers to control access
to a network while other software systems are used to protect against malware. However
many of these measures and methods are not implemented in current SCADA systems
and, in particular, PLCs. Even if implemented SCADA hardware may still be vulnerable
to hardware trojans and counterfeits. An alternative to bit-level credentials has emerged
using Radio Frequency (RF) radiated emissions, (unintentional or intentional) to extract
unique characteristic device information at the physical waveform level that can be used to
discriminate between hardware devices. This method has been shown to be succesful in a
large scope of research, [4, 7, 9, 11–13, 15–20, 23, 25, 27, 38, 39, 43, 46, 49].
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2.2 RF Signal Collection
2.2.1 Radiated Emissions
RF-DNA fingerprints used to discriminate among devices are constructed from captured
radiated emissions from a given Device Under Test (DUT). Previous research can be
categorized into two types of radiated emissions: Intentional Radiated Emission (IRE) and
Unintentional Radiated Emission (URE). IRE RF energy is intentionally broadcasted and
is engineered to carry information. Typically IRE RF communication signals have well
defined regions such as a preamble or payload.
URE RF energy is leaked electromagnetic energy produced during DUT operation.
UREs by comparison are not engineered or well structured. This creates an added
challenge of repeatability when collecting URE. Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute
(RF-DNA) IC device fingerprinting exploits characteristic differences in device waveforms
caused by variances in manufactured devices. These characteristic differences are identified
by calculating statistics for device’s waveform attributes with the assumption that the
waveforms being fingerprinted have the same structure. The IC components collected
against are often shielded to mitigate RF interference to and from other components.
Capturing repeated waveforms from such components requires added measures compared
when to IRE collections.
URE signal collections share physical aspects with as IRE collections however URE
collections often require different equipment and collection procedures. Collections can be
invasive, or non-invasive. One example of a non-invasive technique is using an Electro
Magnetic (EM) probe. Previous research efforts have used non-invasive techniques to
capture IC electrical responses directly from connecting pins. Information exploited from
this method includes (power, timing, control, data, etc.). Although these methods are non-
invasive they do require contact, i.e. a physical connection is required [2, 21]. Whereas
RF-based methods utilize an EM probe in close proximity to the DUT [29].
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2.2.2 Correlation
As mentioned, this research makes use of URE which is not well structured or
engineered. A method to identify an Region Of Interest (ROI) is necessary (where an ROI is
analogous to a communication burst). A correlation based extraction process developed in
[43] is implemented for ROI determination and extraction. The extraction process is based
on a matched filter implementation which often used for the estimation of communication
symbols in digital communication systems [42]. The autocorrelation (Rxx[k]) and cross-
correlation (Rxy[k]) operations discussed in Section 3.3 are defined here,
Rxx[k] =
∑
n
xnx∗n−k (2.1)
Rxy[k] =
∑
n
xny∗n−k (2.2)
Cross correlation is used in most modern day wireless communication systems as a
means of signal detection. Here it is used as ROI detection. Similar to how a matched filter
is implemented.
2.3 Device Discrimination
2.3.1 Classification
Using RF-DNA fingerprints classification is the process by which a given DUT is
identified. The fingerprints from known devices are used in the classification process to
develop, or train, a classification model. The established model is then used to align a
DUT fingerprint to one of the known devices characterized in the classification model. One
of the research goals is to use classification to correctly identify PLC hardware devices.
Two model development processes or classifiers are considered and are briefly discussed
in Sections 2.3.1.1-2.3.1.2.
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2.3.1.1 MDA/ML
An overview of the Multiple Discriminant Analysis Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML)
process is given here, and is implemented as described in [9]. The MDA/ML process is an
extension of Fisher’s two class linear discriminant analysis to NC-1 classes. The research
presented here considers NC=5 classes (5 PLC hardware devices, Authorized Devices). The
MDA/ML classifier projects vectors defined by individual device fingerprints F using the
projection matrix W. Where W is the optimal projection matrix that maximizes inter-class
distance, and minimizes intra-class distance.
FWi = W
T F (2.3)
A device is aligned to one of the NC classes based upon maximum likelihood conditional
posterior probability with the assumption of equal probabilities, where likelihood is
estimated for each device’s projected fingerprints’ assuming a multivariate Gaussian
distribution [9]. Figure 2.2 shows a visual representation for a NC-1=2 dimensional feature
space, and Figure 2.3 shows the class projections resulting from projection matrices W1
and W2 respectively. In this example, projection matrix W1 maximizes inter-class distance,
clearly separating the three classes. Projection matrix W2 does a poor job of separating the
classes as evidence of the class overlap in the projection space.
2.3.1.2 GRLVQI
The Generalized Relevance Learning from Vectors Quantized Improved (GRLVQI)
process is implemented as described in [36]. The GRLVQI process has the following
advantages over the MDA/ML process: 1) there is no underlying assumption regarding the
distribution of the data 2) it is well suited for situations where the number of inputs may
not be consistent across classes and 3) most importantly it allows the ranking of individual
features according to their ability of creating classification boundaries that minimize Bayes’
risk.
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Figure 2.2: MDA/ML Model Represen-
tation for NC= 3 Classes.
Figure 2.3: Class MDA/ML Projection
onto NC-1 Dimensional Plane
The GRLVQI process uses NP=10 prototype vectors, where each vector is composed
of NF features, (See Table 3.3 for the feature dimensionalities considered) to represent
a given device. The GRLVQI process as used in this research performs classification by
measuring the Euclidean distance from a projected fingerprint to the prototype vectors. The
projected fingerprint is classified as belonging to the class/device for which the Euclidean
distance from the projection fingerprint to the prototype vector is minimized. Although
other distance measures exist (Mahalanobis, Manhattan City Block, Nearest Neighbor
etc.) Euclidean distance is used here, and has been shown successful in previous research
[4, 34]. Figure 2.4 is a visual representation of prototype vectors representing a respective
class/device with an unknown fingerprint being presented for classification. Figure 2.5 the
shows relevance ranking for Time-Domain (TD) features for a given fingerprint.
2.3.2 Verification
During classification DUT fingerprints are aligned to a class (correctly or incorrectly).
Verification is a one-to-one “how much like” comparison with the goal of determining
weather the unknown DUT fingerprints can be verified as the known device it is being
14
Figure 2.4: GRLVQI Feature Space
Figure 2.5: GRLVQI Relevance Rank-
ings
aligned to during Classification. While a device is classified according to the class it is
closest to using the selected distance metric, a device is verified (authorized or rejected)
based the actual value of the distance metric.
This research follows verification techniques used in [6, 8, 36]. Verification results
shown here are presented as Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves. Both
classifiers presented in Section 2.3.1 use the same verification process which is further
discussed in Section 3.7.2.
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III. Methodology
This chapter discusses the approach taken to develop Radio Frequency Distinct Native
Attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprints used for Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) device
discrimination. The process is applied to data collected at Oak Ridge National Laboratory
(ORNL) using the National Instruments receiver platform. The collection process is based
on an existing Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) collection process [43]. During
the signal collection phase at ORNL several receiver timing issues arose that demanded
an alteration to the existing collection process. The collection alteration resulted in fewer
Region Of Interest (ROI)s being collected compared to previous AFIT research. For this
reason the ROI extraction method was also modified to ensure an adequate amount of ROIs.
The process shown here documents the process used for collection at ORNL and reflects
the changes made from previous research efforts.
Table 3.1: Receiver Collection Platforms
AFIT Collection Platform ORNL Collection Platform
Platform Manufacturer Lecroy National Instruments
Platform Model Number WaveMaster PXIe-1085 Chassis,
PXIe-8135 Embedded Controller
Platform Cost $127,000.00 $25,600.00
3.1 PLC Device Description
This research focused on applying the hardware discrimination process to 10 Allen
Bradley SLC-500 PLC 5/02 CPU module devices that are collected against. The PLCs used
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are Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) devices whose internal Microcontroller Unit (MCU)
has comparable architecture to other COTS Integrated Circuits (IC) devices [7, 9]. The
devices listed are numbered/named based on variable markings and labels in the same
manner as [43], shown in Table 3.2. One device, ZC was used in initial collections [43],
but is not considered for comparison due to operational difficulties encountered during the
ORNL collection.
Table 3.2: Component Under Test (CUT) to PLC Identity ID Mapping Based on Device
Labelling and Logos [43].
Device ID MCU Label MCU Logo PLC ID
Device1 NXP None WQ
Device2 NXP None WV
Device3 None Philips KG
Device4 None Philips QI
Device5 Philips Philips KV
Device6 Philips Philips OV
Device7 Philips Philips RG
Device8 None Philips ZC
Device9 None Philips ZZ
Device10 Signetics & Intel Signetics ZA
The devices are split into groups: Authorized Devices and Rogue Devices. Authorized
Devices are PLC hardware devices whose RF-DNA fingerprints are used for model
development which is discussed in Section 3.7. Rogue Devices are PLC hardware devices
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whose RF-DNA fingerprints are not used during model development. Rogue Devices are
used only during Verification which is further discussed in Section 3.7.2.
PLC devices are assigned as either an Authorized or Rogue device based on their relative
spectral intensity plots, shown in Figure 3.1, [43]. Authorized Devices presented in this
research are {WQ,WV,KV,RG,OV}. The Rogue Devices presented in this research are
{KG,QI,ZA,ZZ}. Although labeled Authorized/ Rogue for the purpose of this research,
all devices are authentic Allen Bradley PLCs purchased through standard COTS channels.
Figure 3.1: “Spectral intensity plots generated as emission maximum PSD responses over
a 20 × 20 uniform grid above the PLC MCU surface.” [43]
3.2 RF Signal Collection
3.2.1 PLC Collection Configuration
Each Device Under Test (DUT) is removed from it’s manufactured housing so that the
PLC mainboard is completely exposed. This allows the RF-probe to be placed on top of
the MCU within a given DUT. The exposed PLC mainboard is placed onto a table which
holds the RF probe and allows precise positioning of the probe in three dimensions. The
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PLC mainboard is powered through extension cables with the same extension cables used
for all DUTs.
There are two collection platforms used, detailed in Table 3.1. The collection platforms
are configured in the same method, with one exception. Inspector software is used as the
instrument controlling software for the Lecroy collection platform. Matlab® is used as the
instrument controlling software for the National Instruments collection platform.
3.2.2 RF Probe Placement
Because each DUT must be connected and disconnected, the collection procedure has
the potential for error in probe placement. A probe placement routine is implemented to
mitigate repeatability issues. The probe placement routine developed in [43] is adopted
into Matlab® (replacing Inspector) as the software to control the physical re-positioning of
the probe for the National Instruments collection platform using AFIT generated control
functions.
The routine has two steps: 1) Course Probe Placement - The probe is placed at a
physically marked predetermined position on the DUT surface 2) Refined Probe Placement
- the probe is repositioned to the site where Unintentional Radiated Emission (URE) will
be collected for the purpose of generating RF-DNA fingerprints.
Once the probe has been coarsely placed based on the physical markings, emissions are
collected at NL=100 locations on a (DX = 10) x (DY = 10) dimensional grid where the
grid size is (xm = 0.75cm) x (ym = 0.75cm). At each grid location a collection is taken of
the URE produced during the execution of one Ladder Logic Program (LLP) scan. During
this phase of probe re-positioning the LLP being executed by the DUT is referred to as the
alignment LLP. The alignment LLP consists of a known sequence of NOP = 6 operations:
{MOV, SQR, MOV, SQR, MOV, SQR}.
To determine which of the NL=100 locations the RF probe will return to for further
collection, a previously collected and stored alignment reference signal xR[n] representing
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a pristine alignment LLP collection is used. While there are NL=100 alignment signal
collections, there is only one alignment reference signal xR[n]. xR[n] consists of Nop = 2
operations: {MOV, SQR}. The alignment reference signal is empirically chosen by means
of a superior quality URE collection. The same alignment reference signal is used in all
DUT alignment routines.
The final re-positioning of the probe (refined probe placement) is determined by cross-
correlating the alignment reference signal xR[n] with of the each NL=100 alignment signal
collections. The location yielding the highest correlation metrics derived as in [43] is
chosen as the refined probe position and all further DUT URE collections are taken at
that location.
3.2.3 Sampling and Triggering
The frequency of interest for the generation of RF-DNA fingerprints is fc=55.5 MHz.
The observed clock frequency of the Allen Bradley PLC MCU is fclk=18.5 MHz. The
strongest component of the observed clock frequency is the third clock harmonic centered
at f =55.5 MHz. To prevent aliasing during signal collection an in-line Low Pass Filter
(LPF) is used with a cutoff frequency of fco=81.0 MHz.
All DUT RF emissions are collected at the sampling frequency rate, fs=250 MSps using
a near field probe with baseband bandwidth Wbb=500 MHz. The existing AFIT data set
was collected using the LeCroy collection platform, and the ORNL dataset was collected
using the National Instruments collection platform as shown in Table 3.1. The collected
emissions are stored sequentially as 8 bit integer values representing the measured voltage
level of the collected signal at evenly spaced time intervals.
For the National Instruments collection platform using Matlab®, two triggers are
supplied to the collection platform to instantiate a signal collection. Both triggers must be
present for a signal collection to occur. The first trigger is sent from a Laptop being used as
an instrument controller, (controlling the RF-probe placement and the collection platform)
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to the collection platform indicating that the RF-probe is in position for a collection. This
is done so that the physical movement of the RF-probe is synchronized with the collection
platform and collections are not taken while the probe is moving between one of the
NL=100 locations. The second trigger is a threshold value, based on the voltage across
a Light Emitting Diode (LED) on the DUT, prior to the first MOV operation of an LLP.
The LED voltage is toggled as a square wave with an approximate duty cycle of 50% equal
in length to the LLP scan time. This trigger indicated the start of an LLP scan.
When both triggers are present, indicating the probe is in position (first trigger) and an
LLP scan has instantiated (second trigger) a tS IG=5 ms collection is taken. A tS IG=5 ms
collection is taken to ensure the entire URE produced from the execution of an LLP scan is
collected as the LLP scan is approximately tLLP=3 ms. This triggering process is used for
each NL =100 locations, as well as the subsequent refined probe placement position.
3.3 Post Collection Processing
After signal collection, post-collection processing is done using Matlab®. The
collections are read into Matlab® from the binary file and converted to type double for use
with Matlab® filtering functions. The signals are then processed according to the following
steps: 1) digital bandpass filtering 2) down-conversion to an intermediate frequency 3)
down-sampling 4) SNR scaling.
1. Bandpass Filtering - The signals are bandpass filtered using a digital 8th-order
Butterworth bandpass filter with a center frequency of fBP=55.5 MHz and -3.0 dB
bandwidth of WBP=1.0 MHz. This is done using the built in Matlab® function
butter[] to generate filter coefficients and filtfilt[] to perform the actual
filtering. The magnitude response of the filter is shown in Figure 3.2.
2. Downconversion - After bandpass filtering, the signals are downconverted from
the range of f ∈ [55.0, 56.0] MHz to the range of f ∈ [1.0, 3.0] MHz. Once
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Figure 3.2: Magnitude Response of 8th order bandpass Butterworth Filter [43].
downconverted the signals are then digitally filtered with a LPF. The cutoff frequency
for the LPF is fco = 3.5 MHz.
3. Downsampling - After filtering and downconversion the signals are downsampled
by a factor of DS 20, reducing the number of samples to yield an effective sample
rate of fs=12.5 MSps. Downsampling is accomplished by selecting the first
element/sample of a signal, and henceforth every 20th element/sample, where
unselected elements/samples are discarded.
4. SNR Scaling - independent Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) realizations
are added to the post-processed signals to simulate a range of channel Signal to
Noise Ratio (SNR), . This is done to reduce the number of collections that would
otherwise be needed to evaluate performance under degraded conditions. The range
of SNR values presented in this research is, SNR ∈ [−30 : 30] dB in S NRstep=5 dB
increments. For each signal collected, at each SNR considered, Nnz=10 noise
realizations are simulated. It is important to note that although SNR scaling is
considered to be digital post-processing it occurs after ROI Extraction, discussed
in the next section.
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3.4 ROI Extraction
As mentioned previously an LLP execution takes approximately tLLP=3 ms with the
actual ROI spanning tROI=1.5 ms. The signal collection platform collects for tsig=5 ms.
This is done to ensure the entire ROI is captured in the collected waveform. ROI extraction
process isolates the ROI from the unwanted part of the signal collection. ROI extraction
occurs after digital signal processing, therefore all signal collections described henceforth
are assumed to have been digitally post-processed according to Section 3.3 with the
exception of added noise realizations.
Consider a given collection sequence xC[n] = xC[1] + xC[2]+. . . +xC[n], n=1,2. . . NC,
where NC is the last collection sample. Also consider following sequences xAS [n] and
xES [n]. xAS [n] represents the alignment start, i.e. discrete samples of the LLP operations
{MOV,SQR} (those operations that begin every scan of the LLP that is being executed).
xES [n] represents the alignment end, the operations {SQR,MOV} (those operations that end
each LLP).
The start of an ROI is determined by cross-correlating the collected signal sequence
xC[n] with the alignment start sequence xAS [n]. The end of an ROI is determined by cross-
correlating xES [n] with the signal collection xC[n]. The ROI length is then estimated by
finding the difference between lag values for the corresponding maximum cross-correlation
values for the start time CMS and end time CME.
The mean and standard deviation of the estimated ROI lengths are calculated, µROILen
and σROILen respectively. A threshold value of µROILen + 1.5σROILen is established and any
ROIs exceeding the threshold are discarded. As previously mentioned in Chapter 2 and
shown in [43], unaccounted CPU operations can occur during the execution of the LLP.
The extra CPU operations are unwanted and render an ROI unusable. ROIs that contain
extra operations (those ROIs the exceed the length threshold) are therefore discarded.
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Figure 3.3: Region Of Interest Extraction
The remaining ROIs are sorted in descending order by the mean of their maximum
cross-correlation values {CMS ,CME}. From this sorted set (first element in the set has the
highest mean of {CMS ,CME}), the top 250 ROIs are chosen for Fingerprint generation. The
remaining ROIs are not considered further. Signal collection at ORNL included multiple
collections over the course of two consecutive days. Ultimately, 500 ROIs are used for
fingerprint generation (250 ROIs from the two independent collections).
After selecting the best quality ROIs based on the correlation metrics described, the ROIs
must be extracted from the collected signal. This is done by using the sample index of the
maximum correlation start and end times.
3.5 Fingerprint Generation
RF-DNA fingerprint generation was implemented in accordance with previous AFIT
RF-DNA fingerprinting research [4, 9, 36, 43]. The process has been applied to sequences
representing Time-Domain (TD), Frequency Domain (FD) and Time-Frequency domain
data sets [4, 9, 17, 36, 43, 49]. For the purpose of this research only TD features are
considered.
For the complex signal x[n] = xre[n]+ xim[n], the instantaneous TD responses Amplitude
a[n], Phase φ[n] and Frequency f [n] are given by,
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Figure 3.4: Abstract representation of RF-DNA fingerprint formation for an arbitrary
sequence divided into NR subregions [49]
.
a[n] =
√
xre[n]2 + xim[n]2, (3.1)
φ[n] = tan−1
[
xim[n]
xre[n]
]
, xre[n] , 0, (3.2)
f [n] =
1
2π
[
dφ[n]
dn
]
(3.3)
The following steps give an overview of the RF-DNA fingerprinting process that is
implemented for fingerprints generated from URE using the instantaneous TD features
defined in Eqns. 3.1-3.3.
1. A selected ROI is divided into NR equal contiguous time-domain sub-regions.
2. Within each subregion the mean µ is calculated and subtracted from all subregion
samples to minimize the impact of collection bias.
3. The N f eat=3 instantaneous TD responses (Amp a[n], Phz φ[n], Frq f [n] ) are found
for each subregion.
25
4. The Nstat=4 statistical attributes (standard deviation σ, variance σ2, skewness γ, and
kurtosis κ) are found for each subregion and each TD response.
5. The resulting statistical attributes are concatenated, and comprise an individual RF-
DNA fingerprint that represents one ROI noise realization for a given SNR and given
device.
6. The process is repeated for all ROIs across all noise realizations, all SNRs, and all
devices.
In total there are NF = 65000 RF-DNA fingerprints per PLC device.
NF = NROI × Nnz × NS NR (3.4)
3.6 Feature Set Dimensional Reduction
The process described in Section 3.5 is implemented using NR=12 subregions as well
as calculating statistics over the entire ROI. The full dimensionality of a given fingerprint
is therefore ND=156.
ND = (NR + 1) × N f eat × Nstat (3.5)
Reducing the fingerprint dimensionality is done by considering a subset of the full
dimensional features. Qualitatively and Quantitatively selected subsets are considered.
Table 3.3 details the dimensionality of the fingerprint sets used for classification and
verification for the results presented in Chapter 4.
Of interest to this research is reducing the dimensionality of the feature set. Dimensional
reduction is explored to enhance experimental-to-operational transition potential of RF-
DNA fingerprinting [36].
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Table 3.3: Feature sets used for Classification and Verification in GRLVQI & MDA/ML
Type Feature Set Number of Features Number of Fingerprints
Full Dimensional Full 156 500
Qualitative DRA Amplitude 52 500
Qualitative DRA Phase 52 500
Qualitative DRA Frequency 52 500
Quantitative DRA Top 33% 52 500
Quantitative DRA Top 10% 16 500
3.6.1 Qualitative
Qualitative feature sets refer sets of fingerprints whose features are qualitatively
selected and are solely composed of either Amplitude, Phase, or Frequency statistics.
The same NR subregions are used to calculate statistics, however the fingerprints in each
qualitative set are of only one time domain response. The fingerprints are one third of
the size of the full dimensional feature set fingerprints. The number of fingerprints in all
feature sets is constant.
3.6.2 Quantitative
Features are ranked in descending order according to their relevance ranking
determined by the GRLVQI process. Quantitative feature sets refer to fingerprints whose
features are a subset of the full dimensional feature set that have been selected based on
a relevance ranking. The Top 33% feature set is composed of the top ranked 52 of 156
features. Those features can be of any time domain response. Likewise the Top 10%
feature set is composed of the top ranked 16 features. The Top 10% feature set is contained
in the Top 33% feature set.
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3.7 Device Discrimination
3.7.1 Classification
Following the formation of RF-DNA fingerprints, PLC hardware discrimination
is performed. Two methods for PLC device classification are considered in this
research, Generalized Relevance Learning from Vectors Quantized Improved (GRLVQI)
and Multiple Discriminant Analysis Maximum Likelihood (MDA/ML). Although
their respective internal mechanisms for hardware classification are different, the two
independent processes make use of the same approach for both classification and
verification. Both classification processes use RF-DNA fingerprints to identify a given
PLC hardware device. RF-DNA fingerprints (generated as described in Section 3.5) are
divided into two equal sized sets; Training fingerprints (xT NG[n]) and Testing fingerprints
(xTS T [n]). The fingerprints are divided based on an interleaved pattern (odd and even
number indices). For the results shown in Chapter 4, the total number of fingerprints used
is NB=500 (NT NG=250 and NTS T =250).
Training/Validation - The xT NG[n] set of fingerprints are used by the GRLVQI
and MDA/ML processes to develop a device classification model. The set of xT NG[n]
fingerprints are divided into k segments following a kfold partitioning process [36]. The
GRLVQI and MDA/ML processes use k-1 segments to develop a classification model,
where the kth segment is held out and is used after the model is developed to perform
model-validation. The kth segment is introduced after model development to assess
the performance of that model in correctly identifying a given devices fingerprints. All
permutations of the k-fold model development and subsequent model-validation are carried
out in turn. After all k-fold model development permutations, the model yielding the best
validation results, (percent correct classification) is chosen. Training/Validation is repeated
independently for each SNR considered.
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Testing - Testing is the phase of model development where previously unseen
fingerprints are introduced to the model that is selected during the validation phase. Testing
assesses the model’s ability to correctly identify devices. The xTS T [n] set of fingerprints
are held out of model development; xTS T [n] fingerprints represent previously unseen data
to assess the performance of the classification model.
3.7.2 Verification
Verification is a method of examination to determine how well a given device’s xTS T [n]
fingerprints resemble what they are being classified as. Verification allows a one-to-one
comparison based on a measure of similarity test statistic zv. The test statistic used in both
MDA/ML and GRLVQI is Euclidean Distance as derived in [9] [36] respectively.
A Probability Mass Function (PMF) of zv is constructed for each device/class . A device’s
classified identity is then verified (correctly or incorrectly) by a binary decision against
a threshold value tv. If the test statistic is below the threshold the device is declared
Authorized (correctly or incorrectly). Conversely a test statistic over the threshold is
declared Rogue. The threshold value tv as used in this research is implemented as described
in [36].
xTS T [n]→ zv[n] < tv : Authorized (3.6)
xTS T [n]→ zv[n] > tv : Rogue (3.7)
3.8 Performance Evaluation
Classification performance as described in Section 2.3.1 is evaluated at an arbitrary
baseline performance of 90% correct classification for a given SNR. The CAVE=90%
baseline performance metric has been used in previous AFIT research efforts [9, 36, 43].
The possible verification outcomes are shown in Table 3.4. Verification performance
is assessed using Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve plots. There are two
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Table 3.4: Authorized vs. Rogue Identification
Actual Claimed Declared Outcome
Authorized Authorized Authorized True Authorized Accept
Authorized Authorized Rogue False Authorized Reject
Rogue Authorized Authorized False Rogue Accept
Rogue Authorized Rogue True Rogue Reject
types of ROC curves that are presented in Chapter 4, Authorized Device Identification and
Rogue Device Rejection. Authorized Device Identification is a plot of False Verification
Rate (FVR) vs. True Verification Rate (TVR). Rogue Device Rejection is a plot of Rogue
Accept Rate (RAR) vs. TVR.
FVR =
∑
FalseAuthorizedRe ject∑
TrueAuthorizedAccept+
∑
FalseAuthorizedRe ject (3.8)
RAR =
∑
FalseRogueAccept∑
TrueRogueRe ject+
∑
FalseRogueAccept (3.9)
TVR =
∑
TrueAuthorizedCount∑
TrueAuthorizedCount+
∑
FalseAuthorizedCount (3.10)
The Authorized ID plots show how much a given Authorized Device looks like itself
when compared to the other Authorized Devices. The Rogue Device Identification plots
shows how well a given classification model can correctly reject rogue devices and correctly
accept authorized devices.
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IV. Results
This chapter details the results of Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) device clas-
sification and verification processes using the Multiple Discriminant Analysis Maximum
Likelihood (MDA/ML) and Generalized Relevance Learning from Vectors Quantized Im-
proved (GRLVQI) classifiers as described in Section 2.3.1 using Radio Frequency Dis-
tinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) fingerprints developed independently from the Lecroy and
National Instruments (NI) collection platform data described in Table 3.1 are used as inputs
for the classification and verification processes. Section 4.1 shows results for the Lecroy
platform fingerprints, and Section 4.2 shows results for the NI platform fingerprints. For
each collection platform there are 6 feature sets considered as listed in Table 3.3, where all
Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) Feature sets are subsets of the Full Dimensional
feature set.
The RF-DNA fingerprints are developed from Unintentional Radiated Emission (URE)
signal collections taken from NDEV=10 PLC hardware devices where each device has
NF=500 fingerprints. As mentioned in Chapter 3 device ZC is not considered due to
unpredictable device operation. The fingerprints are generated from Time-Domain (TD)
signal responses as described in Section 3.5. Fingerprints in the range of Signal to Noise
Ratio (SNR)∈[-30:5:30] dB are used for comparison of MDA/ML and GRLVQI classifiers
as well as to compare the Lecroy and NI collection platforms. Nnz=10 independent Additive
White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) realizations for each fingerprint at each SNR are used to
simulate channel effects over the SNR range. For the purpose of comparing classifiers,
feature sets, and collection platforms, gain is used to specify the difference of SNR at
which respective performances are equivalent.
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4.1 Expansion of Lecroy Platform RF-DNA Fingerprinting Results
The Lecroy collection platform data set was used in prior Air Force Institute of
Technology (AFIT) research [7, 9, 43]. The existing data is used in this research to expand
upon the previous device discrimination results i.e. results from the Lecroy collection
platform shown, are from previously existing signal collections. The only new signal
collections presented are signal collections taken using the NI collection platform. The
expansion of Lecroy platform collection results includes analysis of feature dimensional
reduction as well as the use of the MDA/ML classifier.
4.1.1 Full Dimensional
Figure 4.1(a)(b) shows classification results using the full dimensional feature set
NF=156, over the SNR range of [-30:30] dB in 5 dB increments. Figure 4.1(a) shows
the MDA/ML classifier achieves a cross-device average CAVE=90.0% correct classification
for SNR>6.5 dB. Figure 4.1(b) shows the GRLVQI classifier achieves the CAVE= 90.0%
correct benchmark for SNR>11 dB. The MDA/ML classifier is outperforms the GRLVQI
classifier with a GS NR≈4.5 dB gain relative to the GRLVQI classifier.
4.1.2 Dimensional Reduction
Qualitative feature sets are dimensional reduced by using features generated from
one of the N f eat=3 TD signal responses described in Section 3.5. The selected features are
a subset of the full dimensional feature set where two TD signal response features types
have been removed.
Consistent across the Lecroy platform Qualitative DRA feature sets, the MDA/ML
classifier outperforms the GRLVQI classifier. The MDA/ML classifier has a GS NR≈5 dB
gain in the Amplitude set, a GS NR≈3 dB gain in the Phase set, and GS NR≈2.5 dB gain for the
Frequency set against the respective GRLVQI Qualitative DRA feature set when comparing
benchmark performance (90.0% correct classification).
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(a) MDA/ML Full feature Testing Results
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(b) GRLVQI Full Feature Testing Results
Figure 4.1: Full Dimensional Testing Results for MDA/ML and GRLVQI Lecroy
Collection Platform
Of the three Qualitative DRA feature sets the Amplitude feature set yields best
classification performance for both the MDA/ML and GRLVQI classifiers. Using the
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(a) MDA/ML Testing Results
(b) GRLVQI Testing Results
Figure 4.2: Lecroy Platform DRA Testing Results
Amplitude Feature results in a benchmark performance gain of GS NR≈3 dB when compared
to both the Phase and Frequency DRA feature sets in both receiver platforms.
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Quantitative feature sets, like the Qualitative feature sets, are subsets of the Full
dimensional feature set. The Quantitative feature sets are constructed by examining the
relevance rankings generated by the GRLVQI classifier. Features are assigned a weighted
value (relevance rank) according to how well they impact classification performance [36].
There are two Quantitative feature sets, Top 33% and Top 10%. As previously mentioned
both feature sets are contained in the Full dimensional feature set; the Top 10% feature
set is a subset of the Top 33% feature set. The Quantitative feature sets are the respective
percentage of the highest ranked features. Although the MDA/ML classifier does not have
the inherent ability to produce relevance rankings, Quantitative feature sets constructed
from the GRLVQI classifier are used by the MDA/ML. Fig. 4.3 shows an overlay of the
relevance rankings for the Full dimensional feature set for both the Lecroy and NI collection
platforms.
The Top 33% feature set outperformed the Top 10% feature set in MDA/ML
classification by GS NR≈2 dB. However for GRLVQI classification the Full, Top 10% and
Top 33% feature sets are statistically equivalent using 95% confidence intervals.
4.2 National Instruments Platform RF-DNA Fingerprinting Results
4.2.1 Full Dimensional
Fig. 4.4 shows the classification results using the Full dimensional feature set
NF=156 for collections taken with the NI platform over the SNR range of [-30:30] dB
in S NRS tep=5 dB increments. Fig. 4.4(a) shows the MDA/ML classifier achieves a cross-
device average CAVE=90.0% correct classification for SNR>16.5 dB. Fig. 4.4(b) shows
the GRLVQI classifier achieves the CAVE=90.0% correct benchmark for SNR>17 dB. The
classifiers here achieve nearly the same performance.
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Figure 4.3: Relevance Rankings for Lecroy and NI Collection Platforms
4.2.2 Dimensional Reduction
Qualitative results using dimensionally reduced feature sets of NF=52 are shown
in Fig. 4.5(a)(b). Consistent across the NI Qualitative DRA feature sets, the GRLVQI
classifier outperforms the MDA/ML classifier. This is opposite of classifier performance in
Lecroy platform collection. The GRLVQI classifier has a GS NR≈4 dB gain in the Amplitude
set. The MDA/ML classifier does not meet the benchmark in the Phase feature set while the
GRLVQI classifier reaches the benchmark for SNR>20 dB. The GRLVQI classifier sees a
GS NR≈2.5 dB gain in the Frequency set against the MDA/ML classifier.
The Amplitude Feature set yields best Qualitative DRA classification performance for
each classifier. Using the Amplitude Feature set results in a benchmark performance gain
of ≥7 dB when compared to both the Phase and Frequency DRA feature sets.
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(a) MDA/ML Full Dimensional Testing Results
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(b) GRLVQI Full Dimensional Testing Results
Figure 4.4: National Instruments Full Dimensional Testing Results
Quantitative The Top 33% feature set outperformed the Top 10% feature set in
MDA/ML classification by GS NR≈7 dB. The opposite is true for GRLVQI classification
where the Top 10% feature set outperformed the Top 33% feature set by less than
GS NR≈3 dB. This is evident in both receiver platforms for the GRLVQI classifier. The
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(a) MDA/ML Testing Results
(b) GRLVQI Testing Results
Figure 4.5: National Instruments Platform DRA Testing Results
GRLVQI classifier is a Machine Learning Neural Network. Due to it’s nature of
model development, it is possible that the classifier suffers from overlearning [52] the
characteristics for a given device’s set of fingerprints. By using a model with less features,
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the model is more robust in characterizing device fingerprints in turn yielding better
classification performance.
4.3 Device Verification
Device ID verification enables a one-to-one ”how much like” device comparison.
Results are shown for 5 Authorized devices {WQ,WV,KV,RG,OV} and 4 Rogue devices
{KG,QI,ZA,ZZ}. Devices were deemed Authorized or Rogue based upon their relative
spectral emission intensity plots [43]. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves are
presented for the Full, and Top 10% feature sets for both MDA/ML and GRLVQI classifiers
as well as both Lecroy and the NI collection platforms. The Full and Top 10% feature
sets were chosen for presentation as they represent the extremes of feature dimensional
reduction. In the interest of space, the other feature set verification plots are presented in
the Appendix. The ROC curves are evaluated at the lowest value SNR where performance
meets the arbitrary 90% average correct classification benchmark performance for the Full
dimensional feature set. The corresponding SNR for the Lecroy collection platform is
S NR=10 dB and the corresponding SNR for the NI platform is S NR=20 dB. Verification
results are shown at these SNRs for the two collection platforms respectively. The test
statistic used as a measure of similarity is Euclidean Distance for all ROC curves.
4.3.1 Authorized Device Identification
One aspect of verification is to verify the identity of a known authorized device. This is
ability is assessed by comparing how similar the authorized devices resemble each other.
The Equal Error Rate (EER) as described in Section 3.7.2 is used as the performance
criteria. Results in Fig. 4.6(a)(b) shows results for both receiver platforms using the
MDA/ML classifier. The MDA/ML classifier outperforms the GRLVQI classifier for both
receiver platforms using the Full Dimensional set. All devices exceeded the EER of True
Verification Rate (TVR)≥90% and False Verification Rate (FVR)≤10% for the Lecroy
collection platform, 3 of 5 devices met the EER for the NI collection platform.
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(a) Lecroy MDA/ML S NR=10 dB
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S NR=20 dB
Figure 4.6: Full Dimensional: Authorized ID Verification Results using MDA/ML
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(a) Lecroy GRLVQI S NR=10 dB
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(b) National Instruments GRLVQI
S NR=20 dB
Figure 4.7: Full Dimensional: Authorized ID Verification Results using GRLVQI
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Fig. 4.7(a)(b) shows results for both receiver platforms using the GRLVQI classifier,
with 3 of 5 devices meeting the EER ≤10% benchmark for the Lecroy platform and 2 of 5
meeting the EER≤10% benchmark for the NI collection platform.
Fig. 4.8(a)(b) shows results for the Top 10% feature set using the MDA/ML classifier,
and Fig. 4.9 shows results for the GRLVQI classifier. Device 5 does not meet the EER
benchmark for any of the results presented using the Top 10% feature set for the verification
of Authorized ID. Device 2 consistently fails meet the EER benchmark for both classifiers
for the Lecroy collection platform.
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(a) Lecroy MDA/ML S NR=10 dB
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(b) National Instruments MDA/ML
S NR=20 dB
Figure 4.8: Top 10%: Authorized ID Verification Results using MDA/ML
4.3.2 Rogue Device Identification
For Rogue Device analysis the same thresholding procedure used to generate the ROC
curves for verification of Authorized Device ID is used to generate ROC curves for Rogue
Device Rejection as is implemented in Section 3.7.2. Correctly authorizing a known device
is only one part of the device ID verification. Rogue devices, devices whose fingerprints
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(a) Lecroy GRLVQI S NR=10 dB
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(b) National Instruments GRLVQI
S NR=20 dB
Figure 4.9: Top 10%: Authorized ID Verification Results using GRLVQI
have not yet been seen and are not represented in the classification models, must also be
considered in verification solution. Rogue Device Identification measures “how much like”
a given Rogue Device resembles each of the Authorized devices. This analysis simulates
a Rogue device presenting bit-level credentials claiming to be a known authorized device
and presenting itself for Device ID verification.
4.4 Cross Receiver Validation
By implementing the same collection process on two receiver collections platforms
and allows direct comparison between the results. Although the Lecroy collection platform
achieves the CAVE=90% baseline performance with a gain of GS NR≈10 dB over the NI
platform, it should be noted that AWGN is added to the collected signals to degrade to
meet the desired performance level. At the collected SNR (i.e. the absence of simulated
AWGN) the NI collection platform is able to achieve results of 100% correct classification
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Figure 4.10: Full Dimensional: Rogue Device Rejection Verification Results using
MDA/ML
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Rogue Accept Rate (RAR)
T
ru
e 
V
er
ifi
ca
tio
n 
R
at
e 
(T
V
R
)
 
 
3:1
3:2
3:5
3:6
3:7
4:1
4:2
4:5
4:6
4:7
8:1
8:2
8:5
8:6
8:7
9:1
9:2
9:5
9:6
9:7
EER
(a) Lecroy GRLVQI S NR=10 dB
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Rogue Accept Rate (RAR)
T
ru
e 
V
er
ifi
ca
tio
n 
R
at
e 
(T
V
R
)
 
 
3:1
3:2
3:5
3:6
3:7
4:1
4:2
4:5
4:6
4:7
8:1
8:2
8:5
8:6
8:7
9:1
9:2
9:5
9:6
9:7
EER
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Figure 4.11: Full Dimensional: Rogue Device Rejection Verification Results using
GRLVQI
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Figure 4.12: Top 10%: Rogue Device Rejection Verification Results using MDA/ML
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Figure 4.13: Top 10%: Rogue Device Rejection Verification Results using GRLVQI
for the Full dimensional feature set. Applying the verification process at the collected SNR,
all devices meet the EER for both classifiers, for both Authorized Device ID Fig. 4.14 and
Rogue Device Rejection Fig. 4.15.
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(a) National Instruments MDA/ML
shown at the collected SNR
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Figure 4.14: National Instruments Authorized ID results at the collected SNR
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(a) National Instruments MDA/ML at
the collected SNR
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(b) National Instruments GRLVQI at the
collected SNR
Figure 4.15: National Instruments Rogue Rejection results at the collected SNR
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V. Conclusion
This chapter gives a summary of the results for Programmable Logic Controller
(PLC) device discrimination using the Generalized Relevance Learning from Vectors
Quantized Improved (GRLVQI) and Multiple Discriminant Analysis Maximum Likelihood
(MDA/ML) classifiers considering dimensional reduction analysis of Radio Frequency
Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) time domain feature sets, using two different receiver
platforms. Section 5.1 provides a summary of the key research activities. Sections
5.1.1-5.1.2 provide a summary of the research findings and results comparing classifier
performance based on feature set dimensionality, as well as device discrimination
performance based on receiver platform. Section 5.2 describes recommendations for future
work of PLC device hardware discrimination and RF-DNA fingerprinting.
5.1 Research Summary
Improvement of cybersecurity in National Critical Infrastructure remains a government
priority. Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, which are used
to control and monitor critical infrastructure such as waste water treatment centers, power
generation plants, and traffic grids, are directly in line with this priority. PLCs are a basic
unit of a SCADA system used to control low-level operations such as controlling the state of
a valve, monitoring temperature or activating relays. As with almost all electronic devices
PLCs make use of Integrated Circuits (IC)s which can be counterfeited or manufactured
with hardware trojans [1, 10]. In critical SCADA applications potentially compromised
hardware is a concern and could inflict grave damage. As such PLCs are chosen
to demonstrate a proof of concept demonstration for a hardware device discrimination
method.
Although much work has been done at securing PLCs at high layers of the Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI) communication model, comparatively less research has been at the
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lowest layer, the physical waveform layer. One method of augmenting higher layers of
security by use of the physical layer is by exploiting characteristic differences in waveforms
inherent to a particular device caused by component tolerances during manufacturing . This
is one focus of Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)s Radio Frequency Intelligence
(RFINT) program. The program has targeted many device and signal types with the goal
of augmenting bit-level security, enabling human-like device discrimination and analyzing
Side Channel Analysis vulnerabilities [4, 7, 9, 11–13, 15–20, 23, 25, 27, 38, 39, 43, 46, 49]
The goal of this research was to verify repeatability of existing AFIT signal collection
methods for other receiver platforms, as well as to expand upon previous results
by exploring the effects of fingerprint feature dimensional reduction. Verification of
repeatability was accomplished by collecting Unintentional Radiated Emission (URE) from
PLC devices in accordance with the collection procedure implemented in [43] using the
National Instruments (NI) receiver platform at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL).
Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA) was applied to the NI signal collection as well as
previous data sets collected using the Lecroy collection platform used at AFIT. The results
of these collections are shown in Chapter 4.
Additional research contributions were made by comparing the previously used
MDA/ML and GRLVQI classifiers [4, 7, 9, 17, 36, 38, 49] using Time Domain RF-DNA
fingerprints, to assess hardware component discrimination. The classifiers were used to
perform classification of known authorized devices and verify their claimed identity, as
well as detect and discriminant rogue devices.
Performance of classification was assessed using an arbitrary CAVE=90% correct
classification baseline performance as consistent with previous AFIT research [36].
Verification performance was assessed by 1) selecting the classification model with the
lowest Signal to Noise ratio meeting the baseline performance 2) generating Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves at the associated Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) and
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evaluating the Equal Error Rate (EER) point of True Verification Rate (TVR)≥90% and
False Verification Rate (FVR)≤10%.
5.1.1 Cross-Platform Validation
To verify repeatability of signal collection methods, PLC device emissions were
collected using an alternative receiver, the NI collection platform. The collection process
was successfully repeated and comparable classification and verification results were
obtained. All dimensional fingerprint sets considered in this research met the average
CAVE=90% correct classification baseline performance for both the MDA/ML and GRLVQI
classifiers, albeit the sets achieved the baseline performance at varying SNRs. Although
repeatable results were obtained the Lecroy platform outperformed the NI collection
platform results by GS NR=10dB in the Full Dimensional feature set for benchmark
performance. The Full Dimensional baseline performance metric was used to select the
SNR to evaluate ROC curves for the verification process.
The MDA/ML classifier performed best matched with the Lecroy receiver with a gain
of GS NR≈3dB of performance averaged across feature sets versus the GRLVQI classifier.
However the GRLVQI classifier when used with the NI collection platform saw a gain
of GS NR≈4dB of baseline performance averaged across feature sets versus the MDA/ML
classifier with a gain of GS NR=12dB with the Top 10% feature set.
With the exception of one feature set for the Lecroy platform, both receivers failed to
meet the EER for the verification of all authorized device IDs. Both receivers repeatedly
failed to correctly verify device 5 regardless of feature set. However both receivers achieved
100% EER for Rogue Device Rejection.
5.1.2 Dimensional Reduction Analysis
Two types of feature dimensional reduction were considered in this research. Qualitative
DRA feature sets were composed of statics generated from only one time-domain signal
response {amplitude, phase, frequency}. Features in Quantitative DRA were selected based
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on GRLVQI relevance rankings. The GRLVQI has the inherent ability to rank features
used in model development according to their influence in separating device/class vector
representations. This provides an advantage over the MDA/ML classifier as the reduction
of features improves memory storage, processing time, and classification processing
complexity with acceptable loss in classification performance. Two Quantitative feature
sets composed of a percentage of the top ranked features were considered: Top 33% and
Top 10%. Both feature sets are subsets of the Full dimensional feature set, and the Top
10% feature set is contained in the Top 33% feature set.
MDA/ML performance is impaired by the reduction of feature dimensionality for all
feature sets presented for classification and verification in both receivers. The opposite is
true for the GRLVQI classifier in which the Top 10 % feature set matched or exceeded
performance of the Full dimensional feature set based on 95% confidence intervals. Both
receiver platforms ranked feature number 51 as the most influential feature for GRLVQI
model development. Feature 51 is the Skewness of the Amplitude of Region 9.
5.2 Future Work Recommendations
The research results presented here show the effects of feature dimensional reduction
in two different receiver platforms using two different classifiers. Both classification and
verificaiton of PLC hardware device discrimination are shown to be succesful here and
warrant continued investigation including,
1. Alternate RF-Probe: During the signal collection process outlined in 3.2.2 the
placement of the RF probe requires precise alignment and any subsequent collections
require the probe re-positioned. A less precise RF-probe, more akin to an antenna
may not require such a rigorous placement routine and further mitigate challenges
arising from repeatability.
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2. Expansion of Feature Types: This research only considered Time-Domain signal
response features. Previous AFIT research has shown other feature types such
as Frequency Domain features and features derived from Gabor transforms to be
successful for RF-DNA fingerprinting [4, 36].
3. Alternate IC Devices: Signal collections in this research were taken from the
embedded microcontroller on the PLC mainboard. PLC device discrimination can be
further expanded by using URE from other IC devices embedded on the mainboard
to develop RF-DNA fingerprints.
4. Expansion of Software Anomaly Detection: Previous AFIT research assessed PLC
ladder logic operation verification using Correlation Domain and Time Domain
features [43]. PLC software anomaly detection can be further expanded by
considering the feature dimensional reduction analysis demonstrated in this research.
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VI. Appendix
This appendix presents are the remaining device classification results for both the
Lecroy and National Instruments (NI) receiver platforms for both classifiers.
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(a) Lecroy MDA/ML Amplitude Testing Results
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(b) Lecroy GRLVQI Amplitude Testing Results
Figure 6.1: Lecroy Qualitative Amplitude Classification Results
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(a) Lecroy MDA/ML Phase Testing Results
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(b) Lecroy GRLVQI Phase Testing
Figure 6.2: Lecroy Qualitative Phase Classification Results
52
−30 −20 −10 0 10 20 30
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
SNR (dB)
A
ve
 P
ct
 C
or
re
ct
 
 
Dev1
Dev2
Dev3
Dev4
Dev5
 Ave
(a) Lecroy MDA/ML Frequency Testing Results
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(b) Lecroy GRLVQI Frequency Testing Results
Figure 6.3: Lecroy Qualitative Frequency Classification Results
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(a) Lecroy MDAML Top 33% Testing Results
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(b) Lecroy GRLVQI Top 33% Testing Results
Figure 6.4: Lecroy Quantitative Top33 Testing Averages
54
−30 −20 −10 0 10 20 30
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
SNR (dB)
A
ve
 P
ct
 C
or
re
ct
 
 
Dev1
Dev2
Dev3
Dev4
Dev5
 Ave
(a) Lecroy MDAML Top 10 % Testing Results
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(b) Lecroy GRLVQI Top 10% Testing Results
Figure 6.5: Lecroy Quantitative Top 10% Testing Aves
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(a) NI MDAML Amplitude Testing
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(b) NI GRLVQI Amplitude Testing
Figure 6.6: NI Amplitude Testing
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(a) NI MDAML Phase Testing
−30 −20 −10 0 10 20 30
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
SNR (dB)
A
ve
 P
ct
 C
or
re
ct
 
 
Dev1
Dev2
Dev3
Dev4
Dev5
 Ave
(b) NI GRLVQI Phase Testing
Figure 6.7: NI Phase Testing
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(a) NI MDAML Frequency Testing
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(b) NI GRLVQI Frequency Testing
Figure 6.8: NI Frequency Testing
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(a) NI MDAML Top 33% Testing
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(b) NI GRLVQI Top 33% Testing
Figure 6.9: NI Top 33% Testing
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(a) NI MDAML Top 10% Testing
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(b) NI GRLVQI Top 10% Testing
Figure 6.10: NI Top 10% Testing
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